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EVERY ROSE HAS ITS THORN:
A NEW APPROACH TO DEACCESSION
Andrew W. Eklund*
INTRODUCTION
In 1961, Edgar and Bertha Rose donated $1 million to Brandeis
University to form the Rose Art Museum ("the Rose").' Initially, the Rose had
no acquisition budget, so the now-7000-piece collection was built on gifts.2
Focused on twentieth-century art, the collection includes a strong selection of
post-war artists like Andy Warhol, Jasper Johns, and Roy Lichtenstein,3 many
of which were acquired through the initial gifts to the museum.4 In the face of
the financial crisis and reduced donations due to the Bernard Madoff scandal,
Brandeis University's board of trustees voted unanimously to close the Rose
and sell the entire collection on January 26, 2009.5 Valued at approximately
$350 million, the Rose was targeted to help deal with Brandeis' budget deficit,
alleged to be as much as $10 million,6 as well as a decline in the University's
endowment, from $712 million to $549 million, or twenty-three percent, since
the financial crisis began.7 No one at the Rose, not even the director and the
chairman of the board of overseers, was involved in the University's decision,
and the Massachusetts Attorney General was not notified of the University's
plans until after the decision was made.8
Outcry was immediate and intense. Within a day of the announcement,
Brandeis alumni started a petition to keep the museum open and current
students planned a sit-in.9 Described as a "scandal,"'o articles and editorials
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2010; B.A., Art (History),
Williams College, 2007. The author would like to thank Professor Joel Paul for his support in the creation of
this note.
I. Geoff Edgers, Rose Clan protests Brandeis proposal; Family demands art museum staY open to the
public, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 2009, at B I.
2. Randy Kennedy and Karl Vogel, Outcry Over a Plan to Sell Museum s Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 2009, at CS.
3. Editorial, War ofthe Rose, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2009, at A 16.
4. Kennedy and Vogel, supra note 2.
5. Geoff Edgers, Ailing Brandeis will shut museum, sell treasured art; No other choice, says president,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2009, at Al.
6. Id.
7. Editorial, Art at Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at A20.
8. Kennedy and Vogel, supra note 2.
9. Peter Schworm, Crisis raises questions on Brandeis campus: At issue are speed of cuts, other
changes, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 2009, at B1.
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from the New York Times' and the Boston Globel2 (among others) criticized
the trustees' decision as being poorly-planned and ill-advised; an alumnus
characterized Brandeis' move as "forfeit[ing] this most basic responsibility" of
universities to "attend to something more essential than the bottom line."' 3
Even the economics of selling the collection in the current state of the art
market has been criticized. 14 Facing a huge backlash only days after the initial
announcement, Brandeis President Jehuda Reinhartz suggested that while the
university might not sell the collection, the Rose would change from being a
museum to a study and research center.'5 Surprisingly late in the game, the
Rose family itself condemned the trustees as "plundering" the collection and
demanded that the Rose stay a museum and not become an academic fine-arts
center. While claiming that the situation at the Rose had nothing to do with
his decision, President Reinhartz announced that he would step down from his
position at Brandeis no later than June of 2011.17 The Rose remains open as of
April 2010.
Although selling art for funding is not unheard of, the incident at the Rose
is an extreme example of why a new standard is needed in dealing with the
practice of deaccession, the sale or transfer of a work of art held by a museum.
Three different methods for handling deaccession have been suggested over
the last twenty years. Although each model deals with different elements of
the deaccession process, none proposes an overarching method that takes into
account the ethics to which American museums are supposed to hold
themselves. The decision to deaccess, judicial review of deaccession, and
potential consequences of improper deaccession should be considered as a
whole rather than as discrete elements.
The purpose of this Note is to suggest a fourth, hybrid approach to
deaccession, and to apply its analysis to the events that happened at Brandeis.
The approach takes elements of the other models, and based on the American
Association of Museum's Code of Ethics for Museums, proposes a new
standard. Part I gives an overview of the American Association of Museums'
Code of Ethics for Museums and a brief explanation of the structure of
museums and their governing bodies. Part 11 explains the three pre-existing
proposals for how to deal with the practice of deaccession. Part III assess these
proposed models against the Code of Ethics for Museums. Finally, Part IV
10. Sebastian Smee, Critic's Notebook, Hawk this gem? Unconscionable, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 2009,
at A9.
11. Art at Brandeis, supra note 7.
12. War ofthe Rose, supra note 3.
13. Miles Unger, Op-Ed., A betrayal oftrust at Brandeis, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2009, at C9.
14. Kennedy and Vogel, supra note 2.
15. Geoff Edgers. Brandeis may keep art. says president: Reaffirms need to close museum, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2009, at B I.
16. Katie Zezima, Museun Familv'Denounces Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at A16.
17. Peter Schworm. Brandeis president to step down: Says Rose oatcry didn 't affect move, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 25, 2009. at B I.
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proposes a new method for dealing with deaccession both before and after the
decision has been made, and applies the proposal to what happened at Brandeis
University. As it is beyond the scope of this Note, the relationship between the
trustee's dual duties to Brandeis and the Rose Art Museum will not be
discussed.
1. BACKGROUND
A. ETHICS FOR EVERYONE
In 1991, the American Association of Museums ("AAM") first adopted
the Code of Ethics for Museums ("the Code"), most recently amended in
2000. In its current form, the Code can be divided into sections: an
introduction,' 9 a general statement of purpose giving the overall spirit of the
Code,20 and mostly bullet-pointed sections pertaining to governance,21
collections,22 and programs.2 In each of these bulleted sections, the Code
states that a museum, its governing body, and any programs a museum may put
on must "promote the public good rather than individual financial gain."24
Because the Code is propagated by the AAM it will be assumed that the
principles stated therein best express the needs of the art world.
1. The Spirit of the Code
After a short introduction, the Code begins with a general statement of
purpose: "Museums make their unique contribution to the public by collecting,
preserving, and interpreting the things of this world. . . . Their missions
include collecting and preserving, as well as exhibiting and educating with
materials not only owned but also borrowed and fabricated for these ends." 25
This overarching principle pervades every element of the Code.26 While
taking federal, state, and municipal law as a given, the Code implores that
these laws pertaining to museums are a bare minimum.2 7  Before a final
reemphasis of the duty to the public, the Code specifically addresses conflict of
interest, stating:
Where conflicts of interest arise-actual, potential, or perceived-the duty
18. American Association of Museums, Museum Ethics, http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/
ethics/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
19. American Association of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums 1 (2000), http://www.aam-
us.org/museumresources/ethics/upload/Code-of-Ethics-for-Museums.pdf (last visited Apr. 3 2010).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3, 4.
25. Id. at 2.
26. See generally id.
27. Id. at 1, 2.
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of loyalty must never be compromised. No individual may use his or her
position in a museum for personal gain or to benefit another at the8 expense
of the museum, its mission, its reputation, and the society it serves.
2. Governance
The Code next establishes rules of governance. Noting that, "[m]useum
governance in its various forms is a public trust responsible for the institution's
service to society," 29 the Code lays out nine things the museum's governing
body must ensure, including that, "the museum's collections and programs and
its physical, human, and financial resources are protected, maintained, and
developed in support of the museum's mission," 30 that "policies are articulated
and prudent oversight is practiced,"3 ' and that "governance promotes the
public good rather than individual financial gain." 32
3. Collections and Programs
Thirdly, the Code discusses duties related to collections. For this section,
the Code presumes "rightful ownership, permanence, care, documentation,
accessibility, and responsible disposal.' Because this Note does not deal
with acquisition practices, proper ownership will be assumed for the purposes
of this Note as well. The Code then sets out ten obligations of a museum to its
collection; most pertinently, the Code states that a museum will ensure that:
[D]isposal of collections through sale, trade, or research activities is solely
for the advancement of the museum's mission. Proceeds from the sale of
nonliving collections are to be used consistent with the established standards
of the museum's discipline, but in no event shall they be used for anything
other than acquisition or direct care of collections.34
Additionally, the Code demands that "collections-related activities promote the
public good rather than individual financial gain."35
In a comparatively short section, the Code establishes six duties of
programs, stating that a museum must ensure that its "programs support its
mission and public trust responsibilities," 36 that "programs are accessible and
encourage participation of the widest possible audience consistent with its
mission and resources,"37 and that "programs promote the public good rather
28. Id. at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id.






37. Id. at 4.
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than individual financial gain."
B. MUSEUMS AND THEIR TRUSTEES
Museums are typically considered public trusts. 3 As such, museums owe
40a duty to the public as a whole and not to any particular person.4 Trustees of
charitable trusts like museums have a greater duty than regular trusts, such as
faithful administration in carrying out the trust's purpose and protecting the
beneficiaries' interest in the trust.4' Although often afforded great latitude in
their decision making, trustees must "follow the intentions and directions of
the creator of the foundation in serving the best interest of the beneficiaries."42
Additionally, oversight over charitable trusts is typically provided for by
statute or common law, and a state's attorney general may have a right to
prevent the sale of a museum's holdings.43
II. DEALING WITH DEACCESSION
Over the past twenty years, three different approaches towards
deaccession have emerged: heightened scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and low
scrutiny. Since each model would approach the Rose case differently, the most
appealing version of each proposed solution is summarized below.
A. GABOR AND HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
In his comment Deaccessioning Fine Art Works: A Proposal for
Heightened Scrutiny, David R. Gabor argues that deaccession decisions should
be subject to strict scrutiny because most museums, public or private, are
supported by both direct and indirect governmental subsidies.44 Additionally,
museums "serve the cultural and educational needs of the community." 45
Deaccession is a problematic process.46 Unlike the acquisition of a work
38. Id.
39. Jason R. Goldstein, Note. Deaccession: Not Such a Dirty Word, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213,
214 (1997) (but see id. at 218, where art museums are likened to "a hybrid of charitable corporation and
trust").
40. Id.
41. Chris Abbiante, Comment, Protecting "Donor Intent in Charitable Foundations: Wayward
Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV 665 at 687 (1997) (citing EDITH L. FISCH ET AL..
CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 513, at 391 and § 521, at 403 (1974)).
42. Chris Abbiante, supra note 41, at 688 (citing H. THOMAS JAMES, Perspectives on Internal
Functioning ofFoundations. in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS. 192, 193 (Fritz F. Heinmann ed., 1973)).
43. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 214-15.
44. David R. Gabor. Comment. Deaccessioning Fine Art Works: A Proposal for Heightened Scrutiny, 36
UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1989).
45. Id. at 1008 (quoting In re Wilstach's Estate, I Pa. D. & C.2d 197 at 207 (1955)).
46. Gabor, supra note 44, at 101 1.
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of art, museums are typically quiet when they deaccess a work. This may be
in order to avoid offending donors or their heirs.48 Additionally, discreet
deaccession may even help avoid legal action:
If donors give objects with anything even resembling instructions, they may
contemplate legal action in the wake of an unpopular disposal. By drawing
as little attention to its activities as possible, museums try to avoid the issue
altogether. To circumvent legal problems, many major muspums no longer
accept, or highly discourage, gifts with restrictive covenants.
This is not to say that museums always have bad motives for deaccessioning a
work of art. Gabor suggests that there are five general reasons to deaccess art:
taste, upgrading, isolation, redundancy, and funding.5 0 Issues of taste relate to
changes of preference among patrons of the museum; "committing large
resources to maintaining a 'dead' collection (i.e., works in storage) may not be
responsive to public needs." 5' Upgrading means selling a work of art to
acquire a higher-quality work, not necessarily of the same genre as the original
52work. Isolated works are those that may not fit in with the rest of the
collection.53 Duplication or redundancy, possibly the most common reason for
deaccessioning a work, has to do with the notion that a museum may not need
54or want multiple works that are very similar to one another. Lastly, a
museum might sell a work out of a need for funding.55 This is where the Rose
fits in, and interestingly, Gabor suggests that this is the "most controversial use
of deassessioning."
Because there are a wide variety of reasons why a museum might want or
need to deaccess a work, Gabor rejects the notion that deaccession should
never be allowed. 7 However, he does advocate for a heightened level of
scrutiny, wherein museum directors or trustees could be held personally liable
58for the decision to deaccess an artwork. Additionally, deaccessed items
might be returned to the museums.5 9  More drastically, Gabor proposes that
works might even be subject to passive reverter clauses, which would cause
illegally-deaccessed works to revert back either to the donor or the state rather
than to the museum;60 reverter back to the donor is preferred by Gabor for both
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1011-12.
49. Id at 1013.
50. Id. at 1016-20
51. Id. at 1017.
52. Id.at 1017-18.
53. Id. at 1018.
54. Id. at 1019.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id. at 1015 (cf Patty Gerstenblith. The Fiduciary Duties of Mtseun Trustees. 8 ART & L. 175 (1983)
(arguing that charitable donations held in public trusts should not be allowed to return to private hands)).
58. Gabor, supra note 44, at 1031.
59. Id.at 1031-32.
60. Id at 1032-34.
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practical and intellectual reasons.
B. WHITE AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
A more moderate approach to deaccession is suggested by Jennifer L.
White in her note When It's OK To Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty
Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Operating
Expenses. Going directly against the Code as it stood at the writing of her
note, White proposes that, "[C]ourts should approve a museum director's use
of proceeds from the sale of deaccessioned art to meet operating expenses if
the director's conduct comports with the duties of trustees under the law of
trusts." 62 White focuses on the differences between how museum directors
would be treated under trust law versus corporate law. Because the duties of
loyalty and care are more rigorous for trustees than for corporate directors,
White prefers that the law of trusts govern decisions made by museums.64
Under White's proposal, courts would evaluate a deaccession decision
under a three-pronged test.6 5 Under the first prong, courts would assess
whether there were legitimate needs to deaccess the artwork in question.
However, under White's reasoning, "As long as revenue is directed back to a
public good in some form, whether ... in the form of building restoration,
extended hours for the museum, or another public benefit, the deaccessioning
has served the requisite public purpose." 67 This is contrary to the standards set
by the Code, which states that, "[I]n no event shall [proceeds] be used for
anything other than acquisition or direct care of collections."68  Arguably,
building renovations may directly care for collections, but extended hours
would likely not fall under this protected category.
If the director can prove the action was for the public good, White's
second pron is whether the purpose could have been achieved without
deaccession. A court would assess the adequacy of the museum's
deaccession policy and then probe for reasonable alternatives. 70 In particular,
White asks if the museum could have acquired the needed funds through
fundraising, leasing (the deaccessed) artwork to other institutions, or placin
the work in traveling exhibitions, which would also bring in needed revenue.
White argues in favor of leasing the work to other institutions or traveling
61. Id. at 1034.
62. Jennifer L. White, Note, When It s OK To Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework for
Analizing the Deaccessioning ofArt to Meet Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1041, 1048 (1996).
63. See generally id.
64. Id. at 1051-54.
65. Id. at 1059.
66. Id.
67. Id at 1060.
68. American Association of Museums, supra note 19, at 3.
69. White, supra note 62, at 1060.
70. Id. at 1060-62.
71. Id. at 1061-63.
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exhibitions, as they make the work more accessible while still bringing in
money for the museum.72
Finally, if a court finds that there were no other alternatives to
deaccession, White proposes that the court inquire into the nature of the
purchaser of the artwork.73 This prong favors sales to entities that allow for
public display of the artwork rather than private purchasers, especially because
if the work is kept from the public, the museum has less support for its public
purpose argument. 74 This prong also suggests that public institutions be given
the option to match a private bidder's offer within a certain amount of time.75
Thus, White proposes that deaccessioning be allowed when it serves the public
good, there are no alternatives, and the public is likely to continue to have
access to the works in question.
C. GOLDSTEIN AND Low SCRUTINY
The most forgiving end of the spectrum is described by Jason R.
Goldstein in his note Deaccession: Not Such a Dirty Word. Goldstein
"recommends more liberal use of museum deaccessions as a means of raising
operating funds necessary for the care and maintenance of the museum's
collections, programs, and physical plant." 76  Goldstein argues that strict
application of trust law may force museums to close down entirely in the face
of low funding.77 Although stipulating that all deaccessions should be made
with full disclosure to the public, Goldstein proposes that, "[T]rust agreements
should use plain language to stipulate that donations become the property of
the museum for serving the public trust. . . . [This] may require the sale of a
gift made to the museum and the use of those proceeds for acquisition or
maintenance."
Furthermore, museum trustees may face a much higher standard when
asked to adhere to the mission statement of a museum, "an inherently vague
document subject to many interpretations. By contrast, when managing a
corporation, corporate directors may use their business judgment, limited only
by the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.80 In light of these facts, Goldstein
advocates that museum personnel be held to the same standards as corporate
directors and not to the higher standards of trustees. Goldstein proposes that,
"The deaccessioning of property by the museum must be consistent with the
72. Id at 1062.
73. Id at 1063.
74. Id.
75. Id at 1064.
76. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 216-17.
77. Id. at 217.
78. Id. at 226.
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mission of the museum as interpreted and practiced by the board of trustees."8 2
Thus, Goldstein's proposal could be described as application of the business
judgment rule conditional on the full disclosure of deaccessions.
Ill. CONTRASTS WITH THE CODE
Because Gabor, White, and Goldstein each represent a different approach
towards deaccession, each will be contrasted against pertinent sections of the
Code. Part A deals with Governance. Part B deals with Collections and
Programs. Part C deals with how each proposal comports with the spirit of the
Code.
A. GOVERNANCE
The Governance portions of the Code pertinent to this Note emphasize
protecting the museum and its mission, proper oversight and public openness,
and duty to the public.83  All three proposed methods recognize that
deaccession may sometimes be necessary to protect the museum and its
mission, whether to make the collection fit together better, to afford longer
hours, or to renovate buildings.84 Gabor is the most dubious of deaccession for
maintenance purposes. By contrast, the Code says that the governing body
should ensure that "the museum's collections and programs and its physical,
human, and financial resources are Protected, maintained, and developed in
support of the museum's mission." Assuming that this can be applied to
decisions to deaccess art, this places Gabor in a stricter camp than even the
AAM. Because Gabor realizes there are indeed more reasons for deaccession
than mere funding, his suspicion is not entirely well-founded; what may seem
like a funding-oriented decision may in fact serve the long-term interests of a
museum, which would in turn meet the obligations to the museum's mission.
By contrast, the White and Goldstein models allow for the possibility that
deaccessions be used to pay for maintenance or other purposes.
The Code states that governing bodies must be sure that "policies are
articulated and prudent oversight is practiced. All three proposed methods
recognize a need for proper oversight. While Gabor does complain that,
"Few administrative moves are openly made, and even the decision-making
process itself is hidden," he does not explicitly recommend that the decisions
be made openly; rather, he recommends that policy be made open to donors,
that affected donors should be notified of decisions to deaccess their donations,
82. Iw. at 245.
83. See supra Part I.A.2.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 62, 76.
85. American Association of Museums, supra note 19, at 2 (emphasis added).
86. Id at 3.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 58. 65, 78.
88. Gabor, supra note 44, at 1014.
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and that acquisitions or deaccessions be made public on request.89 White does
not make any demand for public openness at all; Goldstein actually encourages
more openness than the Code demands. 90
Finally, the Code expects that governance procedures promote the public
good rather than individual financial gain.91 Each model has slightly different
ideas of what stands for the public good. Given the reasons Gabor lists for
deacession,92 he seems to view quality and cohesiveness of a collection as best
serving the public good. To Gabor, merely acquiring needed funding is a
dangerous and possibly ruinous reason to deaccess.93  Both White and
Goldstein argue that deaccessioning in order to acquire funding is in fact in the
interest of the public good. However, White advocates that the governing
body be assessed under the law of trusts rather than the more forgiving law of
corporate fiduciary duty advocated by Goldstein.
Overall, Gabor seems to be the outlier in terms of governance. Although
he argues against deaccessioning to acquire funding and critical of the closed
policies of many museums, Gabor nonetheless demands little in terms of actual
openness. By suggesting that museums do not need to do more than warn
donors that artworks are about to deaccessed, and that deaccessions need not
be made public unless the information is requested, Gabor is in essence
allowing for what happened at the Rose to continue happening. Because White
offers little guidance in terms of openness, it must be assumed that an open
process was not a priority in her system. Goldstein, therefore, excels in this
context: complete openness of both procedure and actual decisions made by a
museum as a counterpoint to more relaxed judicial standards.94 Goldstein
recommends little judicial oversight, as he argues in favor of applying the
business judgment rule of corporate fiduciary duty to museum trustees.9 5
Thus, an ideal governance policy would combine the openness espoused by
Goldstein with the traditional standards of trustees advocated by White.
B. COLLECTIONS AND PROGRAMS
The sections of the Code most relevant to this Note deal with Collections
and Programs. The Code states that funds from deaccession should only be
used to acquire new works or take direct care of collections, as consistent with
96
the museum's mission. Programs should be accessible to the largest possible
audience and should support the mission of the museum and its responsibilities
89. Id. at 1047-48.
90. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 226.
91. American Association of Museums, supra note 19, at 3.
92. See text accompanying notes 50-56.
93. Gabor, supra note 44, at 1020.
94. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 226.
95. Id. at 217.
96. American Association of Museums, .supra note 19, at 3.
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as a public trust.97  Both collection-related activities and programs should
promote the good of the public and not individual financial gain.9
In terms of Collections, the Gabor model best adheres to the Code.
Although Gabor lists many reasons for deaccession, funding is clearly
disfavored as compared to reasons that advance the quality and character of a
museum's collection.99  Likewise, the Code states that, "[I]n no event shall
[proceeds] be used for anything other than acquisition or direct care of
collections." 0 0 White believes that, "As long as revenue is directed back to a
public good in some form . . . the deaccessioning has served the requisite
public good."loI Proposing more leeway for decisions to deaccess, Goldstein
questions why museum professionals are held to a higher standard than
corporate boards.' 02 If the business judgment rule were applied to museum
boards, courts would defer to the judgment of a board, regardless of how the
proceeds from deaccession were applied, as long as the board could show it
reasonably believed it was working in the interest of the museum. To employ
a "museum judgment rule" would strip the courts of important oversight over
the decisions of museum boards. This would be detrimental to the public, the
intended beneficiaries of museums.
The American Association of Museums places the public high in its
priorities. The Code says it is a duty to ensure that "programs are accessible
and encourage participation of the widest possible audience consistent with its
mission and resources."' 0 3 A wholesale deaccession of a museum's collection
would not foster public accessibility unless every work in the collection was
transferred to other public institutions. However, when selling to the highest
bidder, it is not always public institutions that can make a winning offer. This
is what makes a combination of the Gabor and White models appealing. Like
the Code, Gabor strongly emphasizes that deaccessions should only be made if
the funds will go directly to the aid of the collections.104 While favoring direct
benefit to collections, White proposes a clear, three-step process for judicial
oversight should deaccession prove be challenged.' 05 As noted above, White
favors alternatives to deaccession if at all possible.106  White's third step
inquires into the nature of the buyer; public purchasers are greatly favored, as
are preemption agreements to give public purchasers a chance to meet the offer
of a private purchaser. 0 7 By contrast, Goldstein only asks that deaccessioning
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3-4.
99. See supra Part II.A.
100. American Association of Museums, supra note 19, at 3.
101. White, supra note 62, at 1060.
102. Goldstein. supra note39, at 244.
103. American Association of Museums, supra note 19, at 4.
104. See supra Part Il.A.
105. See supra Part 1.B.
106. Id
107. White, supra note 62, at 1063-64.
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be made public, but that the decision to do so should be given as much leeway
as possible.' 08
To best adhere to the Code's recommendations on collections, museums
should follow the suggestions of Gabor, and courts should employ the three-
step oversight process of White. Deaccessioning collections often means that
works once available to the public will be kept in private hands. However, it
can be in the best interest of the museum and the public to deaccess works in
order to ensure that the museum as a whole can continue functioning as a
going concern, as all three proposals recognize. By prioritizing deaccessions
that further the collection while still allowing for the process of funding-
oriented deaccessions, the Code can be satisfied while adding oversight and
flexibility.
C. THE SPIRIT OF THE CODE
With regards to museum personnel, the Code stresses that loyalty to the
museum and the public is key: "No individual may use his or her position in a
museum for personal gain or to benefit another at the expense of the museum,
its mission, its reputation, and the society it serves."' 0 This sentence best
encapsulates how the Code views the duty of loyalty museum personnel owe to
their respective institutions. The models proposed by Gabor, White, and
Goldstein fail to address conflict of interest in the decision to deaccess."10
Rather, the models assume that oversight would be used to ensure that
deaccession happens for an appropriate purpose. Each model proposes
different purposes which are believed to serve either the public good or a
museum's mission and would therefore justify deaccession. However, each
method fails to address the possibility that the decision to deaccess might in
fact be inherently unethical.
IV. TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM
A. THE HYBRID METHOD
Duty to the public and the museums are the main goals of the Code when
it lists duties of the governing bodies and the duties surrounding collections.'"
Although each model has quality elements, none of the models are wholly
sufficient. Thus, a new paradigm for conducting and analyzing a decision to
deaccess is needed.
The best version of dealing with deaccession would involve elements
108. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
109. American Association of Museums, supra note 19, at 2.
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from each of the three models. First, the deaccession process needs
transparency.'3 Gabor proposes that museums make their deaccession
procedures public.'1 4  Goldstein proposes that, "[M]useums should invite
public scrutiny by making full disclosure of deaccession activity."'' 5  This
could be in the form of press releases, notification to "members" of the
museum community who have asked to be informed of activity within the
collection, or an entire section of a museum's website devoted to activity
within the collection. Ideally, the museum should be as public as possible
about any and all decisions to deaccess. Additionally, in choosing to deaccess,
White advocates the use of preemption agreements, which would allow public
buyers to match the offers of private buyers within a set amount of time.
Overall, the White model has several appealing qualities for being the
groundwork of court deaccession analysis. White argues in favor of holding
museums to the same standard as other trustees rather than the standard of
corporate officers.' 17 White offers a clear three-pronged method for analyzing
a decision to deaccess.8 A court would first look to see if there was indeed a
legitimate need for deaccession.119 "Need" should include an inquiry into what
the museum proposes to do with the funds acquired through deaccession and to
whom the funds would go to. This would allow for an inquiry into conflict of
interest. Arguments for the public good could be found in a variety of
purposes, but Gabor's preference for collection-related deaccessionl20 should
be favored above mere maintenance of the building. However, maintenance
purposes should not be ruled out as a legitimate need for deaccession.
Additionally, the Code and the mission of the museum should be taken into
account when determining if proper purpose is served by the deaccession. If
the court found need, it would seek alternatives to the decision to deaccess.121
White suggests leasing the work in question or simple fundraising as possible
alternatives to deaccession.122  If no alternatives were available, the court
would finally assess the nature of the buyer.123 Here, the court would prefer
24
public purchaser to private purchasers. This allows for the deaccessed work
to remain available to the public audience.
Finally, if the court determined that the decision to deaccess was been
improper, remedies would be necessary. Although harsh, Gabor's suggestion
that the deciding entity be held personally liable for wrongful decisions to
113. Gabor, supra note 44, at 1013; Goldstein, supra note 39, at 226.
114. Gabor, supra note 44, at 1047-48.
115. Goldstein, supra note 39, at 226.
116. White. stpra note 62, at 1064.
117. See suipra part lI.A.
118. See supra part II.B.
19. White. supra note 62, at 1059.
120. Gaborsupra note 44. at 1019-20.
121. Id at 1060.
122. Id at 1061.
123. Id. at 1063.
124. Id.
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deaccess is appealing because "it would ensure that [decision-makers] have a
personal stake in the [deaccession] procedure." 25 Personal liability, combined
with the standards set above, would help make sure that the deaccession
process is taken more seriously. Gabor's suggestion that wrongfully
deaccessed works might revert back to the donor,126 while interesting, makes
little practical sense. Under the three-pronged assessment, it is possible that
the museum has a demonstrable need, but other alternatives to deaccession
exist. Keeping the artwork in the museum should be prioritized if at all
possible; reversion back to the donor defeats the purpose of keeping the art
accessible to the public.
In summary, this Note proposes that redefining deaccession must begin
with museums themselves. Open policy and practices, and a dedication to
keeping works available to the public, are the first steps. Secondly, courts
need a clear procedure for assessing whether deaccession was in fact proper.
Finally, if deaccession is deemed improper, clear standards for discipline are
needed.
B. THE PROCESS IN ACTION
Applying the proposed standards to the situation at the Rose, we
encounter several problems. While notification of the decision was very
public, the fact that the process was underway was not even known to the
director of the museum. No deaccessions have been made yet, but as the
primary concern seems to be the financial well-being of Brandeis
University,128 it is likely that price and not purchaser will be prioritized if the
collection is indeed deaccessed.
Applying the three-pronged analysis, there is a good chance that the court
would not even find the deaccession to have proper purpose. Under the Code,
"No individual may use his or her position in a museum for personal gain or to
benefit another at the expense of the museum, its mission, its reputation, and
the society it serves." 29 Brandeis has decided to deaccess the Rose for the
benefit of the University, going directly against the Code; additionally, this
decision ignores the fact that the Rose has managed to keep a balanced budget
on its own, it does its own fundraising, and fifteen percent of the money
derived from the Rose's fundraising goes to the University. 30
Even if helping the University were considered a proper purpose for
deaccession, other options may exist. Given that the Rose does its own
125. Gabor, supra note 44, at 1031.
126. Id. at 1033-34.
127. Kennedy and Vogel, supra note 2.
128. Edgers, supra note 5.
129. American Association of Museums. supra note 19, at 2.
130. Roberta Smith. In the Closing of Brandeis Musewn, a Stark Statement of Priorities. N.Y. TIMES. Feb.
2, 2009. at C3.
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fundraising,' 3 ' perhaps Brandeis could solicit donations from benefactors of
the Rose. Additionally, the praise the Rose's collection receives suggests that
money could be made by leasing parts of the collection, possibly as part of a
tour.
Finally, even if no other options are available for Brandeis, the court
would need to look into who would be purchasing the art. As there has been
no indication as to how Brandeis plans to sell the collection, it is impossible to
know who would be acquiring works from the Rose. However, it is possible
that Brandeis might be making a mistake in trying to sell any art right now due
to the combination of the overall economic climate as well as the current state
of the art market.13 2
Thus, under the proposed standards of deaccession assessment, Brandeis
would likely fail at any of several stages of analysis. In this case, sanctioning
the trustees does not seem like a good enough solution. Additionally, the fact
pattern is complicated by the fact that the Rose is part of the University. An
injunction to keep the museum open would be a good first step, but the Rose
might continue to suffer if donors have no confidence in the Rose's ability to
stay open.' 33  Had Brandeis been more open about its desire or need to
deaccess the Rose before announcing that they planned to sell everything,
perhaps this could have been avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
Museums must serve the public. By announcing the plan to uproot the
Rose, Brandeis has angered its own university community as well as the art
world at large. Brandeis has lost the trust of the public and may never fully
recover. By having a more open discussion about their financial straits,
Brandeis could have brought up the idea of deaccessioning the Rose without
fully committing itself to any particular action. Although Brandeis was open
about its decision, this only highlights the need for a more fully-developed and
practiced framework for assessing decisions to deaccess art. Luckily, public
outcry has been so great that perhaps Brandeis will change its mind. This is
simply further proof that public scrutiny is vital in policing museums.
Museums need to hold themselves accountable for their own behavior. If
museums do not hold themselves accountable, the public can. The courts are
already a last line of defense; they should not be the first line of defense as
well. By combining self-policing, policing by the public, and policing by the
courts, deaccession can be limited to those instances that still serve the needs
of the public, not the needs of the few.
131. Id/
132. Kennedy and Vogel. supra note 2.
133. Smith, sipra note 129.
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